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THE GRAND JURY: AN EFFORT TO GET A
DRAGON OUT OF HIS CAVEt
JOHN W. OLIVER*
INTRODUCTION
The subtitle to this discussion of the grand jury and its powers is
borrowed from Mr. Justice Holmes' address, The Path of the Law.'
In making the point that "the rational study of law is still to a large
extent the study of history,"2 Holmes said: "When you get the dragon
out of his cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his
teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength."3
"But," warned Mr. Justice Holmes, "to get him out is only the first
step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a
useful animal." 4 The dragon we shall attempt to get out of his cave is
the ancient, yet modern, institution of the grand jury. I shall not
suggest whether he should be killed or tamed but shall try to give you
the data upon which a judgment might be predicated.
But why should anyone go dragon hunting today?
My personal inclination to emulate St. George was occasioned by a
newspaper article that I read last May in the New York Times while
in New York City. It stated that a Jackson County Grand Jury in
Kansas City had just reported that the Mafia had been operating a
criminal playground in Kansas City. Returning to Kansas City by
way of Detroit and St. Louis, I found like reports in the newspapers
of those cities. Kansas City was again in the national news-and
the news was all bad.
The news of that criminal playground grand jury report spread
quickly to the national magazines. The Reporter, for example, stated
that it was a grand jury report that had "charged that a syndicate
connected with the Mafia has for seven or eight years been operating
a 'criminal playground' in Kansas City under a pact with the police
that has given organized crime free reign... ."' But by the time Life
reached the stands, the fact that it had been a grand jury report that
had merely charged a scandal was entirely omitted. Kansas City's now
full blown police scandal was reported to be on a par with those actual
t Address delivered to the Lawyers' Ass'n of St. Louis, December 20, 1961,
before being appointed to the Federal Court.
* Judge, United States District Court, Western District of Missouri
1. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPEs 167 (1920).
2. Id. at 186.
3. Id. at 187.
4. Ibid.
5. The Reporter, July 6, 1961, p. 17.
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scandals in Chicago, San Francisco and Denver. Said Life maga-
zine: "The police scandal in Denver is merely the most recent of a
series-Chicago, San Francisco, Kansas City. In Denver, as in other
cities, respected private citizens knew about the police depredations
and said nothing-or helped undermine the police with bribes and
handouts."
As I flew back across the country, reading newspapers as I went, I
sensed that the urge to enter the grand jury dragon's cave was going
to get the best of me. Several questions much more important than
injured civic pride began to bother me. If a seven or eight year old
pact had in fact existed between the police of my city and the Mafia-
why had the grand jury failed to indict those who allegedly had made
the pact? And, as the Catholic Reporter of Kansas City was later to
ask editorially: "When will the grand jury's broad and sweeping
charges against Kansas City, that 'playground of crime,' be tested in
court? How can a community protect itself if its good name can be
blackened at will by an agency without permanent public responsi-
bility operating by its own rules ?"
I, therefore, entered the cave over the Memorial Day weekend to
try to drag the grand jury dragon out into the daylight in order to
count his teeth and his claws and to test the actual strength and power
given him by the constitution and laws of this state.
And may I suggest at the outset, that interest in an inquiry as to
whether or not a Missouri grand jury has power to issue general
reports, as distinguished from its unquestioned power to return
indictments, should not be confined merely to the citizens of Jackson
County, Missouri. On September 19, 1961, I noticed that a news-
paper in St. Louis assumed for editorial purposes that Missouri grand
juries do have legal power to make reports.s
That editorial used a recent report of one of your local grand juries
as a springboard for asking, what did a particular individual "have to
say for himself?"' That editorial correctly noted that a defendant
"has the right to wait until he appears in court to answer" an in-
dictment, but as to "other charges which, although they do not allege
crimes," it concluded that the individual was "in a different position"
and that "he owes it to the people... to explain the charges [made
in the grand jury report] satisfactorily."o
On September 22, 1961, that same paper (which I respect and
admire enough to be a regular subscriber) stated that: "The leader-
6. Life, Nov. 3, 1961, p. 18.
7. Catholic Reporter, June 23, 1961, p. 4, col. 1.
8. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 19, 1961 § C, p. 2, col. 3.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
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ship of the Missouri Bar can perform an important service. .... "
Again the editorial conceded that no criminal proceeding has been
triggered by the grand jury's allegations of improper conduct, but
it concluded that "the Missouri Bar is responsible to the profession
and the people for examining the evidence ... that the grand jury
described as 'certainly unethical.' "" May I make clear that I am not
questioning that newspaper's right under the first amendment to com-
ment on a pending case. The newspaper involved, in fact, did much
in 1941 to straighten out the Missouri law on contempt by publication
in State ex rel. Pulitzer Publishing Co. v. Coleman.22 And the Su-
preme Court of the United States settled that question the same year
in Bridges v. California.23
I use the two St. Louis editorials merely as examples of how even a
newspaper with a most excellent record in the field of civil liberties
is prone, perhaps without giving the matter much real thought, to
assume that Missouri grand juries are still authorized under our con-
stitution and laws to make general reports, and that editorial use of
such reports is entirely justifiable.
Whether newspapers generally can so prejudice an entire com-
munity by their comment on a pending case so that a particular de-
fendant cannot get a fair trial under the rule of Shepherd v. Florida4
and its progeny (particularly the concurring opinion in Irvin v.
Dowd,'1 decided in June of last year) is beyond the scope of our dis-
cussion.
Is it not important, however, for all of us to examine the validity
of the assumptions upon which that newspaper based its editorials?
More fundamentally, should any individual be called upon editorially,
or otherwise, to answer charges contained in a general report of a
grand jury which admittedly "does not allege crimes?" Should the
Missouri Bar, or anyone else, accept what is said in a grand jury re-
port about anyone?
Those questions, it seems to me, should concern all citizens of Mis-
souri, regardless of their place of residence. And the answer to those
questions is controlled by the answer to the question of whether a
Missouri grand jury is empowered by the constitution and laws of this
state to make any charges in a grand jury report.
As we approach that question, ponder, if you will, how one is sup-
posed to answer a charge in a grand jury report. In what forum is
he to make his satisfactory answer? To what witness stand is he to
11. Id., Sept. 22, 1961, § B, p. 2, col. 3.
12. 347 Mo. 1238, 152 S.W.2d 640 (1941).
13. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
14. 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
15. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
Washington University Open Scholarship
A DRAGON
call his witnesses? How is he, or anyone else, going to get the members
of the grand jury to violate their statutory oaths of secrecy so that
he can learn the identity of, and cross-examine, the necessarily face-
less accusers?
And who is to make any real and binding adjudication that the
presumption of innocence to which all persons are constitutionally
entitled has or has not been overcome?
Those fundamental questions underlie any inquiry into the subject
of whether or not grand jury reports are authorized by the present
law of Missouri. Those are the teeth and the claws of the dragon.
As a result of my entrance into the cave, I became convinced that
the 1945 constitution and laws of Missouri do not confer power on
Missouri grand juries to publish general reports. And, under date of
June 2, 1961, I prepared a short memorandum of my research entitled:
Inquiry Into the Power of a Missouri Grand Jury. Let us look briefly
to the authorities.
I. DISCUSSION OF LEGAL POWER OF A MISSOURI GRAND JURY
To FILE GENERAL REPORTS
The point of beginning is obviously the 1945 constitution and laws
of Missouri. The Bill of Rights provides:
That a grand jury shall consist of twelve citizens, any nine of
whom concurring may find an indictment or a true bill: ... such
grand jury shall have power to investigate and return indict-
ments for all character and grades of crime; . .. the power of
grand juries to inquire into the willful misconduct in office of
public officers, and to find indictments in connection therewith,
shall never be suspended.'6
There can be no question that Missouri grand juries had the power
from 1875 until 1945 to fie general reports. No provision remotely
similar to Article 14, Section 11 of the 1875 constitution was included
in the 1945 constitution. This section, expressly rejected by the
framers of the 1945 constitution, and entirely omitted therefrom,
provided:
It shall be the duty of the grand jury in each county, at least
once a year, to investigate the official acts of all officers having
charge of public funds, and report the results of their investiga-
tions in writing to the court.'7
Speaking broadly, the only statutory power conferred on a Missouri
grand jury to file any sort of a report, as distinguished from returning
an indictment, is conferred by section 540.020 (2) which provides
16. Mo. CoNST. art. 1, § 16. (Emphasis added.)
17. Mo. CoNsT. art. 14, § 11 (1875). (Emphasis added.)
18. Mo. REv. STAT. § 540.020 (2) (1959).
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that a grand jury shall have power "to examine public buildings, and
report on their condition."'1 9 It should be added that powers to examine
and report on particular public buildings, such as jails, are scattered
throughout the statutes dealing with subjects other than grand
juries.20 However, as I have said, statutory power to report is gener-
ally confined to making reports on the condition of public buildings
as provided in section 540.020 (2) .21
State ex rel. Lashly v. Wurdemczn, 22 the only Missouri case which
has dealt extensively with the power of a Missouri grand jury to re-
port, must be laid aside because it was expressly based on that section
of the 1875 constitution 3 which the framers of the 1945 constitution
rejected.
As a matter of constitutional law, the Missouri cases clearly hold
that the refusal of the framers of the 1945 constitution to include a
provision similar to that in the 1875 constitution (which did authorize
a grand jury to make reports) was a rejection and abolition of the
former power. Ex parte Slater,24 for example, involved a similar
situation, regarding a provision relating to grand juries in the 1865
constitution25 that the framers of the 1875 constitution refused to
carry over into that document. The Supreme Court of Missouri held
that the "clause of the constitution of 1865, which gave sanction to
the statute under which it is claimed the indictment in this case was
authorized, was not inserted in the constitution of 1875, and being
thus abolished, it necessarily abolishes and destroys the statute, which
rested solely upon it for support."26 As a matter of statutory con-
struction, it is clear that the affirmative grant of power27 to report on
the condition of public buildings, under the rule of State v. Salmon, 28
effectively excludes the existence of any implied power to report on
any other matter.
The law of Missouri is entirely consistent with the law generally
announced in regard to grand juries in other jurisdictions.
The courts of all jurisdictions, including Missouri, point out that
historically the ancient English grand jury had a dual purpose. Its
first function was to return indictments. But more importantly, its
second and more important function was to protect the citizen and
19. Ibid.
20. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 221.300 (1959).
21. Note 18 supra.
22. 187 S.W. 257 (Mo. 1916).
23. Note 17 supra.
24. 72 Mo. 102 (1880).
25. M o. CONST. art. 11, § 12 (1865).
26. Ex parte Slater, 72 Mo. 102, 109 (1880).
27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 540.020(2) (1959).
28. 216 Mo. 466, 115 S.W. 1106 (1909).
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the public from unfounded accusation, whether the unfounded accusa-
tions "come from the government or are prompted by partisan pas-
sion or private enmity. ''29
The classic example of protection of the individual against un-
founded charges, of course, was the trial of the Earl of Shaftesbury
at Old Bailey in 1681: "the jury returned 'Ignoramus' upon the bill."
"Ignoramus," under the ancient English common law, meant "we do
not know," hence was equivalent to a refusal to indict. Sir John
Hawkes commented about that time that "a grand jury ought not to
believe coffee-house stories" and that "in truth, it was honor to be an
Ignoramus jury," when necessary to protect a citizen against a tyran-
nical monarch. John Locke, it will be recalled, was Shaftesbury's
secretary, and after the English grand jury saved Shaftesbury from
indictment, Locke accompanied Shaftesbury to Holland where Locke
wrote his influential essay on Civil Liberty. It was that tradition
of frustrating tyrannical persecution by the Crown that caused
Americans to incorporate the institution of the grand jury into the
fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and into the Bills
of Rights of our state constitutions.
Other jurisdictions have ruled on substantially similar constitu-
tional and statutory provisions to those we have in Missouri. Those
cases hold that a grand jury has no power to file a general report
unless expressly authorized by law. Woods v. Hughes,30 decided early
this year by the highly respected Court of Appeals of New York, re-
viewed practically all of the authorities on the subject. Application of
United Electric Workers3l contains the best review of the Federal
cases. In both cases the reports of grand juries were expunged from
the record. In the case of New York, a contrary decision of fifty-five
years' standing was expressly overruled. Both cases relied upon
People v. McCabe,32 which held that:
A presentment is a foul blow. It wins the importance of ajudicial document; yet it lacks its principal attributes-the right
to answer and to appeal. It accuses, but furnishes no forum for a
denial. No one knows upon what evidence the findings are based.
... It is like the "hit and run" motorist. Before application can
be made to suppress it, it is the subject of public gossip. The
damage is done. The injury it may unjustly inflict may never be
healed.33
I would suspect that a great number of people in this room heard or
read something about the report of the "criminal playground" grand
29. 24 Am. JuR. Grand Jury § 3 (1939).
30. 9 N.Y.2d 144, 212 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
31. 111 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
32. 148 Misc. 330, 266 N.Y. Supp. 363 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
33. Id. at 333-34, 266 N.Y. Supp. at 367.
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jury of Jackson County, and of its indictment of four high-ranking
police officers including the then Chief of Police of Kansas City. But
how many of you have heard or read that the indictments against the
former Chief were thrown out of court for failure to allege the com-
mission of any crime; that the new Chief of Police has publicly stated
that there is no Mafia in Kansas City with whom any alleged pact
could have been made; and that on November 22, 1961 the City
Council of Kansas City unanimously adopted a resolution which ex-
pressed the Council's "sincere regret for the humiliation and mental
distress suffered by [former Chief of Police] Brannon as the result
of these unjust charges, and our apologies for the misguided zeal of
the officials responsible therefor"?
The City Council's resolution concluded: "We concur in the recent
editorial in the Star commenting on the injustice wrought upon Chief
Brannon and expressing satisfaction over his vindication."
The Missouri cases that relate to grand juries generally are entirely
consistent with the rules of decision of the cases from the other juris-
dictions which related specifically to the lack of power to file general
reports. As Judge Lamm used to say, the curious may consult Conway
v. Quinn,", Mannon v. Frick," State ex rel. Clagett v. James,0 and
State ex rel. Dalton v. Moody.37
And finally the cases which hold that a grand jury is personally
liable in tort to an individual defamed by an unauthorized grand jury
report should not be overlooked. Those cases quite clearly rest upon
the proposition that no power to report exists. Bennett v. Kalamazoo
Circuit Judge,38 and Bennett v. Stockwell, decided by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in 1916 are the leading cases.
While my legal memorandum was privately handed the Presiding
Judge of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, it became a matter of
public knowledge when one of the lawyers representing one of the
four high-ranking police officers who were indicted by the grand jury,
used it as an authority in support of a motion filed in one of the cases.
Parenthetically, it should be stated that as of this moment three out
of the four indicted officers are now free from any accusation either
by action of the circuit court on motions directed against the indict-
ments or, as in one case, by dismissal by the state for want of evidence
to support the charges made by the indictments. Motions are still
34. 168 S.W.2d 445 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
35. 365 Mo. 1203, 295 S.W.2d 158 (1956).
36. 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959).
37. 325 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. 1959).
38. 183 Mich. 200, 150 N.W. 141 (1914).
39. 197 Mich. 50, 163 N.W. 482 (1917).
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pending in regard to the final defendant.31a May I make clear that I do
not and have not represented any of the defendants in any of the cases.
After my initial inquiry had been handed the court, an Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney prepared a brief in which he attempted to de-
fend the power of a Missouri grand jury to issue general reports. The
basic theory was predicated on the idea that a grand jury at common
law possessed power to file general reports, and that somehow the
alleged common law power could be looked to as a source of power in
addition to that conferred by the constitution and laws of Missouri.
In the face of our statute, which provides that the British criminal
statutes shall never be in force in this State,40 it is most difficult to
see how such a theory is tenable.
Recently in Kansas City, a new grand jury, empanelled by the same
judge who had empanelled the March Term "criminal playground"
grand jury, indicated that it, like its predecessor, was going to file a
general report. Counsel for one of the defendants who learned that the
second grand jury report was likely to single his client out for addi-
tional comment, attempted to raise the question of its legal power by an
application for preliminary writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court
of Missouri. That court refused to take jurisdiction. It is therefore
apparent that the question of the power of a Missouri grand jury to
file a general report remains undecided. But the refusal of the Su-
preme Court to accept jurisdiction in that case will not make the
question disappear. It presents itself every time a circuit judge in
this state charges a grand jury as to its powers and duties.
It should be added, however, that in connection with the prohibition
proceeding, the Kansas City Bar Association appointed a special com-
mittee composed of Rufus Burris, Charles Carr, Ilus Davis, and
Walter Raymond, all past presidents of the Missouri Bar. The com-
mittee was to study the questions of law involved, make up their minds
in regard to the answers to those questions, and file amicus briefs in
the Supreme Court if it should accept jurisdiction.
At the November meeting of the Kansas City Bar Association all
four members of that committee reported that they were of the same
opinion as that expressed in the initial inquiry. They also stated that
they deeply regretted the action of the Supreme Court in refusing to
accept jurisdiction because they felt the question should have been de-
finitively determined so that both the trial courts and the individual
grand jurors would have had the benefit of a Supreme Court opinion
on the subject.
39a. This defendant was cleared between the time this address was delivered
and its publication in the LAW QUARTERLY.
40. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.110 (1959).
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II. THE QUESTION INVOLVED IS ONE OF LAW-
NOT POLICY-AND SHOULD BE So DECIDED
Legal briefs galore are now floating around Jackson County. No
one, however, except an Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, has taken
the position that grand juries have legal power to report generally.
The Kansas City Star has suggested editorially that "there is only one
good way to settle the issue and that is in court. The move for a
prompt decision is in the public interest."41
Some court, of course, will some day be required to decide the
question, and I have attempted to insist throughout the controversy
that it be decided on the basis of what the law provides, and not on
the basis of what one might like for the law to provide.
Policy considerations can not affect or determine the relatively
narrow question of law with which we are here concerned. This is an
extremely important point because there are those among us who
would suggest that ends justify means, and that judges should bend
the law just a bit in order to permit the publication of an unauthorized
grand jury report that somehow is supposed to satisfy an immediate
public demand that rumored corruption be exposed, or that assumed
lax or inefficient operation of public offices be corrected by a news-
paper headline.
The late, great Cardozo, while still a judge on the Court of Appeals
of New York, and before he became a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, set for us the only safe guide that can serve a gov-
ernment that operates under law. In Doyle v. Hofstader,4 2 he stated:
We are not unmindful of the public interests, of the insistent
hope and need that the ways of bribers and corruptionists shall
be exposed to an indignant world. Commanding as those interests
are, they do not supply us with a license to palter with the truth
or to twist what has been written in the statutes into something
else that we should like to see .... A community whose judges
would be willing to give it whatever law might gratify the impulse
of the moment would find in the end that it had paid too high a
price for relieving itself of the bother of awaiting a session of the
Legislature and the enactment of a statute in accordance with
established forms.4 3
It, therefore, has been and is my suggestion, that the public interest
requires that the question of the power of a Missouri grand jury to
report generally be settled and determined in accordance with the
law as it is stated in the 1945 constitution and laws of this state. If
41. Kansas City Star, Sept. 8, 1961, p. 42, col. 2.
42. 257 N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931).
43. Id. at 268, 177 N.E. at 497-98.
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people do not like that law, if they want grand juries to have legal
power to report generally, then they should seek changes in the present
law in an orderly fashion.
III. SHOULD THE MissouRi LAW BE CHANGED TO
AUTHORIZE GENERAL REPORTS OF A GRAND JURY
Before anyone decides to embark upon a campaign to change the
1945 Missouri Constitution and present laws of Missouri in order to
vest Missouri grand juries with legal authority to file general reports,
we suggest that some hard thought be given the question of whether
any branch of government should or may be given legal authority to
expose for the sake of exposure.
Those who argue that a third function be given to Missouri grand
juries, namely, a broad general reporting function, base their argu-
ment on the idea that a grand jury should be permitted to expose
corruption, and to give publicity to conditions which the members of
a particular grand jury believe to be bad, even though such a grand
jury has not been able to gather enough evidence to warrant any
indictments. They do not exactly say "we want the right to give pub-
licity to the smoke because we lack evidence to indict for arson"r-but
the argument is not far from exactly that.
I have never heard anyone seriously contend that any, essentially
political, comment of a group of laymen who happen to have been em-
panelled on a grand jury is of any greater public value to the com-
munity than a report of a chamber of commerce committee, a report
of a bar association or a report of any other group of private citizens.
Such reports should stand on their own merit and should not be given
the added circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness that the public
tends to attach to any official judicial declaration.
Judge Goff, in his opinion in the case of In re Osborne," once sug-
gested that a grand jury sometimes gets an "exaggerated idea of its
own importance." He also added the sobering thought that "if the
gentlemen of the grand jury were to meet as an association of indi-
viduals and give expression to the sentiments contained in a [grand
jury report], little attention would be paid to them... 2 15 Can you
name a single association of private individuals, including Bar Asso-
ciations, that does not complain bitterly about the press' failure to
take proper notice of its committee reports? But on what page does
the press usually print a general grand jury report-particularly if
the report either views with alarm or points with pride. More funda-
mentally, what training and experience do grand jurors have which
44. 68 Misc. 597, 125 N.Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
45. Id. at 604, 125 N.Y. Supp. at 318.
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recommends that they be authorized by law to pontificate with quasi-
judicial approval on such subjects as the general conduct of a sheriff
or a school board, the need for juvenile or additional circuit court
judges, the economic feasibility of public projects or other matters
which, by their nature, are matters of subjective judgment calling for
determination by official legislative bodies or by decision at the polls.
Even the most ardent advocates of vesting a reporting function in
grand juries recognize that the exercise of such power in those areas
is improper and not in the public interest.
Richard Kuh, an Assistant District Attorney of New York City,
made the most reasoned and one of the few unemotional defenses for
a reporting function for a grand jury.46 That defense was predicated
on the theory that as all government grows larger and more complex
"a need develops for new modes of policing the growing body of
public employees to protect their ranks from the encroachment of the
corrupt, the neglectful, and the incompetent. '47
Mr. Kuh, in much the same spirit of the Muckrakers and the Pro-
gressives of fifty years ago, assumed without much examination of
actual experience, that "there is no greater deterrent to evil, incompe-
tent and corrupt government than publicity. 8 "Another advantage,"
argued Mr. Kuh, on behalf of a general grand jury report theoretically
written by laymen, is that its language is "more dynamic, more news-
worthy, and hence more effective publicly1 9 The basic assumption,
of course, is that dynamic, newsworthy publicity (whatever those
words may mean) is in fact a great deterrent to evil, incompetent and
corrupt government. Grand jury reports, of course, had a great deal
to do with electing Thomas E. Dewey as a Republican Governor of
New York. And they had a great deal to do with electing Joseph W.
Folk as a Democratic Governor of Missouri. But must we not inquire
how much permanent improvement was established by those excep-
tional cases? Did evil, incompetent, or corrupt government vanish
from New York City and St. Louis? Must we not therefore examine
a much broader area of our experience with publicity?
We have had a wealth of experience with the power of publicity by
official governmental bodies in recent years. The reports of con-
gressional committees, for example, give us a fertile field for compara-
tive examination. The House Un-American Activities Committee has
always been convinced that exposure by publicity is in the public
interest. Even now it is spending our money to make and distribute
46. Kuh, The Grand Jury "Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play?,
55 CoLumn. L. REv. 1103 (1955).
47. Id. at 1118.
48. Id. at 1122.
49. Id. at 1130.
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motion pictures. And grand jury associations are so confident of their
ability to serve the public interest by having publicity given to general
grand jury reports, that they somewhat resent having anyone even
raise the question of whether or not a general grand jury report is or
is not authorized by law.
All this, therefore, would seem to raise the question of whether
these separate governmental institutions have anything in common
from a legal viewpoint.
IV. WHAT Do CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS AND
GRAND JURY REPORTS HAVE IN COMMON?
It does not take elaborate argument to establish that there are many
points of similarity between the reports of a congressional investi-
gating committee and the presentment of a general report by a grand
jury.
In Hannah v. Larche,"° the Supreme Court of the United States
pointed out that "although we do not suggest that the grand jury and
the congressional investigating commitee are identical in all respects...
we mention them.., to show... the rules.., which have historically
governed the procedure of investigations conducted by agencies in the
three major branches of our Government."-"
Watkins v. United States,52 Barenblatt v. United States,53 Wilkinson
v. United States,5 Braden v. United States,55 and most recently,
Deutch v. United States,56 all of which involved the same congressional
investigating committee, reaffirmed the fundamental proposition that
there are constitutional limits beyond which even a congressional in-
vestigation cannot go.
I say "reaffirmed" advisedly because, in these days when im-
peachment proceedings and hanging are being suggested with regard
to the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, many people
seem to be uninformed about the fact that those cases are but progeny
of Mr. Justice Miller's opinion in Kilbourn v. Thompson," decided by
a unanimous court in 1880, some eighty years ago.
In Deutch,5" decided last June, the Court reversed a contempt con-
viction based upon a witness' refusal to answer a question propounded
50. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
51. Id. at 449.
52. 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
53. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
54. 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
55. 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
56. 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
57. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
58. Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961).
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by a Subcommittee of the House Un-American Activities Committee.
Speaking through Mr. Justice Stewart, the court held:
One of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the[prosecution] has the burden of establishing guilt solely on the
basis of evidence produced in court and under circumstances as-
suring an accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure." Irvin v.
Dowc, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (concurring opinion). Among these is
the presumption of the defendant's innocence. 9
Even more pertinent to our grand jury inquiry is the question of
whether any governmental investigation may be constitutionally car-
ried out for the sole purpose of publicity and exposure. Publicity and
exposure are the only claimed ends that could be served by a general
grand jury report. I have heard of no argument that makes any
greater claim on behalf of a general grand jury report.
The House Committee on Un-American Activities has attempted to
defend its alleged right of publicity and exposure in much the same
fashion as Mr. Kuh would attempt to defend the assumed right of a
grand jury to publicize and expose people and institutions that its
particular members might not like at the moment.
In its report to the Congress, the Un-American Activities Commit-
tee stated that: "While Congress does not have the power to deny to
citizens the right to believe in, teach, or advocate, communism, fascism,
and nazism, it does have the right to focus the spotlight of publicity
upon their activities. . .."60
Again, in a pamphlet issued by the Committee in 1951, the Com-
mittee stated that "exposure in a systematic way began with the for-
mation of the... Committee ... ."61 The Committee therefore believed
itself commanded "to expose people and organizations. .. That is
still its job, and to that job it sticks.' ' 62
The Supreme Court of the United States has made clear that if
exposure for the sake of exposure was in fact the Committee's job, it
was a job to which it could not constitutionally stick. Watkins 3 held
that the Committee's conception of the extent of its constitutional
power to expose by publicity was completely without constitutional
foundation. "Investigations," held the Court, "conducted solely for
the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to 'punish' those
investigated are indefensible."64 In reversing a contempt conviction,
59. Id. at 471.
60. H.R. REP. No. 2, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1939).
61. H.R. Doc. No. 136, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1951).
62. Id. at 67.
63. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
64. Id. at 187.
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with only Mr. Justice Clark dissenting, Chief Justice Warren, speaking
for the majority, held:
We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to
expose for the sake of exposure. The public is, of course, entitled
to be informed concerning the workings of its government. That
cannot be inflated into a general power to expose .... 65
"The Bill of Rights," held the Chief Justice in Watkins, "is ap-
plicable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action." 66
And let us not forget, as we examine our dragon objectively, that a
grand jury investigation is a form of governmental action. Must it
not therefore follow that a grand jury may be entirely lacking in
constitutional power "to expose for the sake of exposure"?
The reasonably strong and most recent reaffirmation of Watkins by
Deutch, after the Court had, in its interim 5 to 4 decisions in Baren-
blatt, Wilkinson, and Braden, seemingly retreated from a realistic
application of the broad principles of Watkins, reduces some of the
anxiety expressed by Mr. Marquis Childs of the St. Louis Post-
Dispatch's Washington Bureau, in his series of excellent articles based
on those cases. Those articles have been reprinted in convenient
pamphlet form under the title of The Erosion of Individual Liber-
ties,67 and are recommended reading for all members of the public,
in which broad grouping I include the members of the legal profession.
But this group of cases does not reduce the importance or the force
of the basic point under discussion. Mr. Childs pointed out that when
some one is subpoenaed to appear before a congressional committee
it is a "common attitude" for people to say "Well, they must be guilty
of something or they wouldn't be up there .. .they'll have to take
whatever happens to them .... " 68
Mr. Childs quoted approvingly from the Detroit speech of William
T. Gossett, vice-president and general counsel of Ford Motor Com-
pany, as had Mr. Justice Brennan in one of his dissenting opinions in
the interim cases above mentioned. Said Mr. Gossett:
When we are frustrated by the feeling that certain people...
gangsters or labor racketeers, for example-have flouted society
with impunity, it is tempting to pillory them through prolonged
public exposure. .... Il
But continued Mr. Gossett, "to try by such means to destroy those
whom we are unable to convict by due process of law may destroy in-
65. Id. at 200.
66. Id. at 188.
67. CHmLDS, THE EROSION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIEs (1961).
68. Id. at 9.
69. Id. at 27.
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stead the very safeguards that protect us against tyranny and arbi-
trary power."
Those words, of course, were spoken-and quoted-by both Mr.
Justice Brennan and Mr. Childs in connection with the exposure by
the publicity attendant to congressional hearings. But are those words
not equally applicable to the publicity attendant to an unauthorized
report of a grand jury? Is not a person or institution equally tried by
the vigilante of publicity, given the charges in grand jury reports, in
much the same fashion as one condemned by an arbitrary congres-
sional investigating committee?
Is it not just as accurate to say that it is a "common attitude" for
people to say "Well, they must be guilty of something or they wouldn't
have been mentioned in that grand jury report . . . they'll have to
take whatever happens to them"? And is it not true that the public
really does not understand that there is a real and fundamental differ-
ence between an indictment and a charge in a grand jury report?
If we really get down to cases, is not the public led into total con-
fusion when a newspaper known for its devotion to constitutional
liberty, recognizes that an indicted person "has the right to wait
until he appears in court to answer"--but with seeming inconsistency,
asserts that one who is merely subjected to "charges... which do not
allege crimes" made in a general report of a grand jury is in a "differ-
ent position" and that he must therefore speak up?
The public is not advised by such talk that "the Bill of Rights is
applicable to investigations as to all forms of governmental action,"
as Watkins held. Nor is it advised that a grand jury's power to in-
vestigate cannot be inflated into a power to expose for the sake of
exposure. The public is led to believe, and may we respectfully sug-
gest, hopelessly misled, into believing that a citizen's "different posi-
tion" in regard to an unauthorized grand jury report somehow re-
quires him "to explain the charges satisfactorily"-a duty admittedly
not present if he actually had been indicted for a crime.
And any "satisfactory explanation" must necessarily be an out of
court explanation which somehow should be made in spite of the fact
that the charged citizen does not know-nor can he legally find out-
who made the accusations that the particular members of a grand
jury accepted for purposes of their report-to say nothing of not
having the right to cross-examine those faceless accusers.
I recognize, as did Learned Hand in his 1952 Albany speech, that
"there is a risk in refusing to act till the facts are all in," but I also
join with him when he inquired "but is there not greater risk in
abandoning the conditions of all rational inquiry?" And I stand with
him when he concluded:
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Risk for risk, for myself, I had rather take my chance that
some traitors (and I would add 'governmental boodlers') will
escape detection than spread abroad a spirit of general suspicion
and distrust, which accepts rumor and gossip in place of un-
dismayed and unintimidated inquiry.
Specifically, Learned Hand believed that a "community is already
in process of dissolution where each man begins to eye his neighbor as
a possible enemy," and "where denunciation, without specification or
backing, takes the place of evidence." Hand counseled strongly against
proceeding on mere suspicion. The public acceptance of the reports of
governmental bodies which are based on suspicion only, and which do
not afford the accused his right to hear, face and cross-examine his
accusers represents, to use Hand's words again, "a solvent which
can eat out the cement that binds the stones together" and "may in
the end subject us to a despotism as evil as any that we dread."
In a lighter vein-but to illustrate the frustration that reflection on
this subject involves-how could the following report of a grand jury
be "satisfactorily answered"?
A stricter examination of applicants for licenses to operate
automobiles in the city, particularly in the cases of women and
young girls, who, because of their impulsive natures and hasty
conclusions, are more likely to miscalculate distances, to dislike
the attitude or appearance of the traffic officer who halts them,
and who, when in a 'jam,' lose their heads more quickly than
male drivers. °
Or how is one to answer the report of a recent Sullivan County
grand jury, recommending the abolition of the township form of
government for that county and concluding: "We recommend the
county court close the 'pitch room' in the basement of the court
house."71
The whole point is that our system of government under law does
not contemplate or tolerate trial or government by general grand jury
reports. "[T] he [prosecution]," said the Supreme Court of the United
States in Deutch, "has the burden of establishing guilt solely on the
basis of evidence produced in court and under circumstances assuring
an accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure .... Among these
is the presumption of the defendant's innocence.1' 72
If we are at all tender to the spirit of liberty and of our constitution,
we shall not say to any individual that he must step right up and give
an out of court explanation of any sort of a charge made in a general
report of a grand jury.
70. The Panel, 1927, pp. 6-7.
71. St. Joseph News Press, Sept. 3, 1961, § D, p. 5, col. 8.
72. Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471 (1961) citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (concurring opinion).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1962/iss2/3
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
If, on the other hand, there is continued insistence on the illegal
and the impossible, then I shall be forced to join the pessimists men-
tioned by Mr. Childs in one of his articles who "take the gloomy view
that ...a serious erosion of American freedoms will continue with
the public at large only vaguely aware of what is happening."1 3 But,
quite frankly, those confident words of Jefferson in his First Inaugural
which hold that "error of opinion may be tolerated, where reason is
left free to combat it,"' 4 make me a sufficient optimist to believe that
reason can even change a newspaper's mind. Particularly when the
full quote from Jefferson's First Inaugural appeared in the lead para-
graph of the reprint of the articles we mentioned earlier.
Is the basic argument against exposure for the sake of exposure by
a general grand jury report but a reflection of the times in which we
live? Or have others given evidence of having shared the doubts that
we have expressed in regard to the proper and perhaps constitutional
power of that ancient institution? We know generally that the grand
jury probably originated at the Assizes of Clarendon in 1166 as an
outgrowth of the Papal Inquisition. I can assure you that a great many
people have preceded me into the dragon's cave and that they have
reported fully on what they found.
V. THE RESULTS OF OTHER EXPLORATIONS INTO THE CAVE
Thomas E. Dewey, who has already been mentioned, writing for
The Panel, the official publication of the Grand Jurors' Association
of New York, in May of 1941,75 more or less denounced "the bright
young theorists, the fuzzy-minded crackpots and others, of less ideal-
istic purpose who would like to see the grand jury abolished."7 The
record shows that a great many people other than "bright young
theorists" and "fuzzy-minded crackpots" with quite well established
idealistic purposes have led the ancient battle to abolish the grand
jury in its entirety. In fact, some prosecuting attorneys and some
members of grand jury associations find themselves quite alone in the
position that they take in spite of Governor Dewey's somewhat im-
moderate language.
Jeremy Bentham, perhaps the most famous of legal reformers,
recommended the outright abolition of the English grand jury in
1821 as "an engine of corruption" which was "systematically packed."
Edward Livingstone, Bentham's disciple in this country, provided in
his 1825 Code for Louisiana that grand juries should have power only
to return indictments and that they be prohibited from expressing
73. CHims, op. cit. supra note 67, at 27.
74. BOWERS, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF PRESIDENTS 50 (1929).
75. Dewey, Grand Jury 'the Bulwarkc of Justice,' The Panel, May, 1941, p. 3.
76. Ibid.
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any opinions on any other matter. Chancellor Kent of New York
wrote Livingstone that: "I am exceedingly pleased with the provision
confining grand juries to the business of the penal law and not ad-
mitting any expression of opinion on other subjects."
David Dudley Field stated in 1846 that the only reason complete
abolition of the grand jury had not been recommended in his famous
New York Code was the then New York Constitution required that
it be maintained.
In 1859, Michigan's legislature, acting pursuant to her recently
amended constitution, abolished her traditional grand jury system.
Between the end of the Civil War and World War I, state after state
wrote new constitutions or amended old ones in order to authorize
their respective legislatures to abolish grand juries. In 1900, our own
Missouri, by constitutional amendment, eliminated any compulsory
use of a grand jury.Y7 Eugene Stevenson, a New Jersey public prose-
cutor, reflected the general thought of our past common experience
with grand juries when he said: "It is difficult to see why a town
meeting of laymen, utterly ignorant both of law and the rules of
evidence should be an appropriate tribunal. The summoning of a new
body of jurors at each term insures an unfailing supply of ignorance."
Stevenson further suggested that no sane legislator "would ever
dream of creating such a tribunal" if it did not already exist.
In 1897, C. E. Chiperfield said: "In the name of progress which is
inevitable, I invoke . . . the abolition of that relic of antiquity, the
twin sister of the Inquisition, the grand jury in Illinois."
In 1915, William Howard Taft (I have difficulty in conceiving how
anyone could knowingly call that gentleman either a "bright young
theorist" or a "fuzzy-minded crackpot") testified against the grand
jury system before the New York State Constitutional Convention.
The American Judicature Society in 1920 joined the ranks of those
favoring complete abolition. In 1928 the American Law Institute
recommended that all criminal prosecutions be commenced by infor-
mation alone. And finally, the Wickersham Commission's report to
President Hoover in 1931 recommended that grand juries be abolished
on the ground they serve no useful purpose and actually impede the
administration of the criminal law.
After suspension from 1917 to 1922 because of World War I, Great
Britain formally and finally abolished its grand jury system in 1933.8
When the British give up on an institution that is over eight hundred
years old, it is fair evidence that they were quite well convinced that
it could not be made to work satisfactorily.
How then is it that there seems to be a great deal of superficial
77. Mo. Laws 1899, p. 382.
78. Administration of Justice Act, 1933, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1, at 578-79.
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popular support for Governor Dewey's almost solitary view that only
"bright young theorists" and "fuzzy-minded crackpots" are concerned
about the extent of power exercised by grand juries?
VI. A SUGGESTED REASON FOR THE LACK OF ANY REAL
EXAMINATION INTO THE EXTENT OF THE LEGAL
POWER OF GRAND JURIES
The basic reason that has permitted the power of grand juries to
go unexamined, apart from lack of interest and concern on the part
of Bench and Bar, has been the wide and usually most favorable
publicity given to the comparatively recent and quite sporadic grand
jury efforts in particular communities in the United States. Up until
quite recently, the need for any examination of the grand jury system
was minimal because in most all state jurisdictions, grand juries were
not used to any real extent, and in the federal system, where the grand
jury is constitutionally required, any effort to file general reports was
consistently and promptly halted by the federal courts, so that the
problem never became acute in that jurisdiction.
As Great Britain was in the process of abolishing its grand jury
system in 1933, however, state grand juries in several cities in the
United States were making national headlines. A grand jury in
Atlanta, Georgia, threatened in a general report that it might indict
the county commissioners if they did not behave. In October, 1933
a general report of a Cleveland grand jury said that none of the local
courts merited the confidence of the people, and its general report
also condemned the Cleveland Bar Association for its lack of concern.
Who can say that such language was not dynamic and newsworthy
and therefore entitled to publicity?
But the country had seen nothing until after Governor Herbert
Lehman of New York appointed Thomas E. Dewey a Special Prose-
cutor in September, 1935. "Racket busting" immediately made the
national headlines.
Without much question, the New York experience and its attendant
sensational publicity had more to do with keeping the idea of a grand
jury alive than all of the other events combined. Warner and Cabot,
in their 1937 article entitled, Changes in the Administration of
Criminal Justice During the Past Fifty Years,79 noted that "the last
fifty years have witnessed the decline of the grand jury."' 80 Those
authors further stated that "one would unhesitatingly predict the
early demise of the grand jury" were it not for the Association of
Grand Jurors of New York County and their publication, The Panel."
79. 50 HARv. L. REv. 583 (1937).
80. Id. at 596.
81. Id. at 597.
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The Grand Jury Association of New York County (the spiritual
father of all other grand jury associations) was organized in 1915
by George Haven Putnam, a New York publisher who had served on
many grand juries, and by other laymen who were in the temper of
those times, sincerely convinced that the grand jury was the only insti-
tution that could initiate investigations into the then abuses in govern-
ment. The Panel commenced publication as a militantly pro-grand
jury periodical in 1924, at a time when the by-products of "Normalcy"
were still in a good many people's minds.
The Grand Jury Association of New York and its publication, The
Panel, have always advocated that grand juries should be vested with
power to file general reports for the reasons we have already noticed.
The record, however, strongly suggests that the filing of general re-
ports by grand juries simply has not produced the desired results,
particularly in these days of sophisticated and organized crime.
Certainly the power to report, as exercised in the past by grand
juries in both New York and in our own state of Missouri, has not
made the problem of corruption in government an academic one. Up
until the 1945 Missouri Constitution, and until Woods v. Hughes 2 was
decided in New York last year, grand juries in both states were re-
porting like mad-but on the record, just how effective has all the
publicity given those reports actually been? Has all the publicity
given general grand jury reports served, as Mr. Kuh argued that it
surely would serve, as a truly great deterrent to evil, incompetent and
corrupt government in New York and Missouri?
Frankly, I believe candor requires us to look for a better sword
with which to attack the wrongdoers in the community. May we
examine briefly what others have tried.
All of the foregoing does not mean that I advocate the abolition of
the grand jury system. It is my personal view that a legitimate case
might be made out for its continuation. But to say that, is not to say
that grand juries should also be given a reporting function. The two
questions are, in my judgment, separate questions and should be
considered separately. I am quite convinced that the arguments made
on behalf of the grand jury system generally do not support the idea
that a grand jury should likewise have power to report. But, as I
have tried to make clear, we Missourians do not reach those policy
considerations. The quite narrow question of law with which we are
concerned boils down to whether the 1945 Missouri Constitution and
the present laws of Missouri do, or do not, vest power in our grand
juries to file general reports. We look now to other jurisdictions.
82. 9 N.Y.2d 144, 212 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1961).
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VII. How OTHER JURISDICTIONS HAVE ATTACKED THE PROBLEM
Great Britain and Canada administer their criminal law completely
outside the glare of publicity. Even when they used grand juries, like
our own federal jurisprudence, they did not permit grand juries to
file general reports. Those countries now operate without the use of
any grand jury at all. In fact, in those jurisdictions, any newspaper
publicity in connection with a pending trial, criminal or civil, would
subject the paper to fine and the newspaperman to confinement in jail
for contempt of court. But more important for our purposes, those
jurisdictions, like our own federal system, never relied, at least in
modern times, on the frail reed of publicity given amateur grand jury
reports as a deterrent against corruption in government.
Why is it that Canada, with a history not basically dissimilar from
our own, has never known in the last century the corruption in govern-
ment that we have had? I would suggest that when the conditions
that Mark Twain described so vividly in The Gilded Age8" were be-
coming evident in both our countries, we in the United States began
to rely somewhat naively on the false hope that exposure and publicity
afforded a real solution to the problems we faced. We opened an era
of muckraking, and we have never really admitted that the idea of
exposure for the sake of exposure sounds much better than it has
proved to be.
Governor Folk's election in Missouri was certainly aided by Lincoln
Steffens but does the record show that the exposures contained in
Tweed Days in St. Louis put an immediate and permanent end to po-
litical bosses in your fair city? Our Kansas City experience is that
success is not so easily attained.
The Canadians, on the other hand, gave their problems a great deal
more hard thought and came up with a remedy, borrowed from the
British experience, that over the years has seemed to be more equal
to the task.
VIII. THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
In 1870 the Canadians established their office of Auditor General.
We have nothing quite like the office of Auditor General of Canada in
either our federal or state governments. The Comptroller General of
the United States is perhaps our closest comparable office, although
we have refused to vest that office with the full power of subpoena.
The present Financial Administration Act of Canada, contains the
provisions of the 1870 law creating the office of Auditor General . 4
That Act provides that the Auditor General shall be appointed by the
Governor in Council to hold office during good behavior until he
83. 10 CLEDIENS, THE WRITINGS OF MARK TwAIN (1915).
84. CAN. REv. STAT. c. 116 (1952).
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reaches the age of sixty-five years. He is removable only by joint vote
of the Canadian Senate and the House of Commons. It is further
provided:
[T] he Auditor General is entitled to free access . . . to all files,
documents and other records relating to the accounts of every
department, and he is also entitled to require and receive ...
such information, reports and explanations as he may deem
necessary for the proper performance of his duties.85
In order that the broadest sort of an investigation be authorized,
the act provides:
The Auditor General may examine any person on oath on any
matter pertaining to any account subject to audit by him and
for the purposes of any such examination the Auditor General
may exercise all the powers of a commissioner under Part I of
the Inquiries Act. 6
Part I of the Inquiries Act provides that inquiry may be made into
and concerning any matter "connected with the good government of
Canada or the conduct of any part of the public business thereof."
87
And to carry out that broad authorization the act provides:
The commissioners (and by reference the Auditor General)
have the power of summoning before them any witnesses, and of
requiring them to give evidence on oath, or on solemn affirma-
tion if they are persons entitled to affirm in civil matters, and
orally or in writing, and to produce such documents and things
as the commissioners deem requisite to the full investigation of
the matters into which they are appointed to examine. 8
Section 5 puts the necessary teeth in the grant of power. It pro-
vides: "The commissioners (and by reference, the Auditor General)
have the same power to enforce the attendance of witnesses and to
compel them to give evidence as is vested in any court of record in
civil cases."8 9 Section 70 of Chapter 116 requires the Auditor General
to report the results of his investigations to the proper authorities
for appropriate action.
I do not necessarily suggest that we adopt the Canadian system in
its entirety or even in part. But I do suggest that we should give
careful consideration to the question of whether that radically different
system of dealing with possible corruption in government has worked
better than our consistently unsuccessful idea that investigation,
exposure, and newspaper publicity somehow affords a real solution
and is the only way to approach the problem.
85. CAN. REv. STAT. c. 116, § 66 (1952).
86. CAN. Rsv. STAT. c. 116, § 74 (1952).
87. CAN. Rsv. STAT. c. 154 (1952).
88. CAN. REv. STAT. c. 154, § 4 (1952).
89. CAN. REv. STAT. c. 154, § 5 (1952).
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IX. OTHER AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
Some of our sister states have abolished the grand jury system and
recognized that it is not very satisfactory to charge some other gov-
ernmental official with the duty of investigation and accusation of
crime unless he is also armed with the power of subpoena. Michigan,
for example, has not had any traditional grand jury for almost a
hundred years. Michigan, however, vested the power of subpoena
in its so-called "one-man grand juries" who, are, in fact, their trial
judges. The cases of In re Murchison9 ' and In re Oliver 1 in the Su-
preme Court of the United States teach us that such a system is not
entirely without its dangers, and that perhaps it could be improved
upon.
Other states have vested subpoena power in their prosecuting
officials. But I think we would all be agreed that we have seen some
prosecuting attorneys in Missouri that we would just as soon not see
in possession of that much power unless very adequate protective de-
vices are created at the same time.
The chief point I would make is that other jurisdictions have estab-
lished what they have determined to be more effective systems of
investigation and prosecution than grand juries. Those states have
rejected the idea that the publicity given a general grand jury report
is a very effective means of meeting the challenge of organized crime
in their communities. Unless our present system is beyond improve-
ment-are we not under duty to examine and appraise the experience
of systems different from our own?
I am also reminded that when congressional investigations rather
than prosecutions were the order of the day in 1924 in regard to the
Teapot Dome scandal, that Mr. Justice Holmes wrote Sir Frederick
Pollock that he was not just then following politics. Holmes added
that "we are investigating everybody and I dare say fostering a belief
too readily accepted that public men generally are corrupt."
As we watch without protest investigations of all kinds into all
departments of government by grand juries and other investigatory
governmental bodies whose procedures do not give those being investi-
gated their day for cross-examination and confrontation by their
accusers, let us remember Holmes' forecast as to what public beliefs
we may be fostering. Let us also remember that we are living in
times that foster tension and that we have among us those who would
build a climate for ultimate and easy answers on the quicksand of
hate, suspicion, and distrust. A general report of a grand jury, or a
list of a legislative committee, gives such persons a document which
they can wave from public platforms.
90. 349 U.S. 133 (1954).
91. 383 U.S. 257 (1947).
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Other freedom loving jurisdictions concluded a long time ago that
the most complicated and difficult job of uncovering organized crime
and its sometime sister, real corruption in government, was one that
called for expert and professional handling; that the official individual
or body charged with that high duty must be as impartial as the
judiciary; that he should be selected as judges are selected; that his
tenure should be as absolutely secure as it can be made; that he be
armed with subpoena power to collect the evidence; and that he file
his report in writing with another official body for it to take appro-
priate legal action consistent with all of the constitutional safeguards
of due process guaranteed any defendant. Should we not give some
study to that experience?
CONCLUSION
The question of whether the constitution and laws of Missouri
presently authorize a grand jury to report is, of course, an important
one because it involves the fundamental proposition of whether an
institution that is in the business of accusing other people of violating
the law is itself complying with the law.
A New York court in the case of In re Grand Jury Report Con-
cerning Investigation,92 held:
The public interest requires that the Grand Jury, like all public
bodies, acts in accordance with the law. ... [U]nless there is
explicit legislative or constitutional sanction for the making of
these so-called reports, no court should indulge in any presump-
tions or inferences, to create the right of Grand Juries to
report ....
Neither the court nor its arm, the Grand Jury, may take unto
itself an authority or power not granted by the Constitution or
the legislature. 3
But important as that question is, there are broader questions con-
cerning the general effectiveness of our administration of the criminal
law that are of equal importance. As we look at the grand jury dragon
that we have gotten out of the cave we see that his teeth are dull, his
claws blunted, and that any real strength for his assigned duty is
woefully weak. There really is no problem of killing or taming the
dragon. He was slain in the country of his birth over a quarter of a
century ago. His demise in this country has been freely predicted
and recommended by those who have given the problem impartial and
serious study.
It is my personal fear that the circumstances that have prompted a
revisitation to the ancient institution of the grand jury will raise
92. 19 Misc. 2d 682, 193 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. County Ct. 1959).
93. Id. at 694, 697, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 568, 570.
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such an emotional reaction that the real problems will be lost in
the shuffle.
But if a speech to a bar association in St. Louis in 1923 resulted in
the first state-wide crime survey, is it too much to hope that perhaps
this talented Bar might someday be inspired to inquire whether there
might be a better way of attacking the problems that are presently
known to be inherent in our present system of criminal law enforce-
ment? Perhaps this Bar may discover methods more calculated to
produce lasting results than the relatively ineffective publication of
what may well be unauthorized grand jury reports. May it not also
be hoped that our future inquiry will be blessed with enlightened
skepticism, and hopefully again, may it have been aided in small part
by our current effort to get a dragon from his cave, onto the plain
and into the daylight.
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